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ABSTRACT

Wireless sensor networks are relatively simple, scalable networks with many applications in the
research field. They can provide benefits that a typical wireless network does not, such as ad-hoc
distribution, lower costs, and higher flexibility. In a scenario where time is of the essence and
dedicated base stations cannot be established, such as a storm or a volcanic eruption, mobile
sinks must be used to gather data. We aim to introduce a fast cluster-based mechanism by which
nodes can securely connect to one another based on trust and network clustering and begin
transmitting data to a collection device while it is available. We also examine two possible
attacks on a trust-based network, and present a heuristic solution for minimizing the negative
effects of such an attack in an energy-efficient way. Through simulation, we show that this
scheme performs better than others in terms of energy efficiency and network lifespan.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are typically ad-hoc networks composed of many
small and inexpensive nodes. These wireless sensors are composed of a wireless radio
transceiver, one or more sensing devices, a micro-controller to interface with the sensors, and a
power source (Lewis, 2004). The various sensors or nodes in these networks can have anything
from simple temperature-sensing hardware to more sophisticated devices that measure anything
from vibrations to elevation to various changes in environment. Wireless nodes can be either
precisely distributed across an area or randomly scattered, and network sizes can range from just
a few nodes to hundreds or even thousands spread over a wide area. WSNs have wide-ranging
applications from military surveys to just-in-time inventory management in automobile factories
(Stankovic, 08).
1.1- Application
One major potential application of WSNs is ad-hoc distribution for research or
observation purposes. Wireless nodes can be dispersed by hand, thrown from a plane, or spread
by any of several other methods. These nodes need to then come online, initialize the network,
learn their surroundings, and begin sharing data (Savarese, 2001).
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We can see in Figure 1 the two typical ways wireless sensors share information in a
multi-hop WSN. In both cases, nodes gather data and send it to a collection device or sink along
a multi-hop path in the network. Method A shows an ad-hoc network that connects to a mobile
sink, whereas in Method B there is a fixed gateway node to which all data is routed. This path is
marked in green in the lower part of the figure. This gateway node can either be wired to a base
station where information is stored in memory, it could be connected wirelessly to an observer (if
it is a more powerful node with more features), or it can store the data in the node’s memory to
be collected later. This latter scenario is where the Method A’s type of organization comes in. In a
hostile or disaster scenario, it may not be possible to have a pre-ordained node to act as the sink.
In this case a mobile sink may be used as seen in the upper part of Figure 1 (Wang, 2005). An
information gathering computer would need to be able to “enter” the network at any point, and
nodes would need to be notified of the new route for data (shown in red/ blue and labelled A in
the figure) (Liang, 2014).

Figure 1: An example of typical WSN structures
!2

Nodes can be used in this manner to monitor difficult to reach dynamic or dangerous
areas. In an emergency scenario or volatile area, nodes may not be meant to be recovered
(Mainwaring, 2002). Because of this, the nodes need to be cheap and able to deliver data for as
long as possible. This typically means that the nodes have small batteries and the minimal
hardware to get the job done so no money is wasted. With that being said, small batteries will
limit the amount of work each node can do before it is lost to the network. As nodes throughout
the network die, large holes can form or the network itself can even split apart leading to lost or
incomplete data (Ahmed, 2005).
To this end, while all of a node’s activities need should be as energy efficient as possible,
any features of a node in a WSN that are not directly related to the gathering and transmission of
data need to be especially light-weight to preserve battery power for the longest amount of time.
For instance, traditional security measures such as multi-step encryption algorithms can be
simply unusable due to power and processing restrictions in these small devices (Butun, 2014). It
is therefore very important to aim not to limit these features, but ensure that they are as efficient
as possible and used only when necessary.
1.2- Security
Security here- like any other type of network- is very important. Even one node acting
maliciously (an outside attacker) or misreporting data (some error in data retrieval or
transmission) can very adversely affect the integrity of the gathered data. The nodes need to be
available to collect data from at any time. If nodes are shut down or removed from the network
!3

(via a virtual or physical attack) then holes can form in the network leading to an incomplete or
misleading topology of the network. Beside that, confidentiality is paramount to a research or
military scenario. It is possible for the data to be useless if it is accessible to adversaries. All
three of these requirements form the traditional CIA triangle (integrity, accessibility, and
confidentiality) and need to be addressed. The information typically only has value if it is
exclusive to the party gathering it.
1.2.1- Trust- Based Security
There are many different approaches to providing network security services in a WSN,
but this work will focus on trust-based relationship building within the network as described in
Section IV. In a trust- based system, nodes work cooperatively to share information with
neighbors about which other nodes are legitimate members of the network. Because of this, these
networks can remain unattended by researchers or other third parties. If each node knows the
level to which it trusts those around it, it simplifies security and makes each node responsible for
its own.
Three scenarios can arise wherein nodes in the network could possibly not be deemed
trustworthy. One such scenario arises in a research situation where there are two or more teams
doing similar work in the same area such as tracking an active volcano’s activity or mapping an
unknown seabed. These teams may need very similar data and could even be using similar
devices for gathering the data. As an example, this could form two separate competing or
conflicting networks- Network A and Network B- in the same area. The owners of these
networks would need to ensure that data gathered in one network cannot be collected by another.
!4

In other words, the member nodes of Network A would need to know not to transmit their
gathered data to the member nodes from Network B even if they were able to communicate. A
second scenario could come from a malicious attack. If an insecure WSN was set up to gather
various data, an attacker could simply drop in a node to act as a new sink and gather whatever
sensitive information the attacker desired. This is a sinkhole or black hole attack (Singh, 2011).
The third scenario is a simple failure state such as a node running out of power or sending out
corrupted information, and now the other nodes need to avoid it. In all of these situations,
neighbor nodes need to pass the information that these problem nodes are to be avoided.
In this work, we will address the problem of how an ad-hoc WSN that is randomly
distributed across a large area can efficiently and gather data. We aim to introduce a scheme
called Cluster Head Trust Propagation that will provide a solution to trust management for data
integrity in these networks that maximizes energy efficiency and longevity of the network while
minimizing overhead. In this scheme, a WSN can establish on-demand trust and organize into
clusters to report to mobile sinks and can protect itself against attacks while maximizing network
integrity.
The rest of this work is organized as follows. Relevant literature is discussed in Chapter
2. In Chapter 3, we look in detail at the problem to be solved and out methods for solving it. An
overview of the simulation software used to gather results in presented in Chapter 4. Numerical
results and analysis are covered in Chapter 5, and a conclusion completes the work in Chapter 6.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

Security has been a very important research topic lately in all type of networksespecially WSNs. As these networks are being used more and more and becoming more “hands
off,” it is critical that these networks meet all of the conditions of the CIA triangle (Stankovic,
2008). In this chapter, we will look at several papers related to the topics of security in WSNs
and trust-based security applications. First, we will look at trust models in WSNs which will be a
very important concept in this work. To reduce battery usage and limit unnecessary network
chatter, trust is used as a simple alternative to authentication each time nodes need to
communicate with one another. Next, we will introduce the concept of mobile sinks and cluster
management in WSNs. We will end the chapter by discussing security issues and attacks types in
WSNs followed by a summary. Throughout our discussions we will use the words sensor and
node interchangeably.
2.1- Trust Models in WSNs
An interesting and novel approach to looking at the issue of trust-based security is
presented in Jiang et al.’s paper “An Efficient Distributed Trust Model for Wireless Sensor
Networks” (Jiang, 2014). In this paper, the authors posit that most trust-based schemes applied in
WSNs are too simple. They are typically based only on the record of successful and unsuccessful
!6

communication history. To remedy this, they propose scheme the “Efficient Distributed Trust
Model” (EDTM). The basics of EDTM are that each node in the network falls into one of three
categories: subject node, recommender node, and object node. If a node A wants to gain the trust
of a node B, then A will be assigned as a subject node and B will be assigned as an object node.
The subject node then attempts to find one or more recommender nodes to vouch for the object
node. The more recommendations a subject node receives, the more trustworthy the object node
is deemed. The authors go on to prove that their scheme has a much higher detection rate of
malicious nodes than does the “Banding Belief Theory of Trust Evaluation” (NBBTE) scheme
with which they compare their work. They found their trust scheme is also more energy efficient,
leaving upwards of 50% more residual power in the battery packs of the nodes than NBBTE.
However, one shortcoming of this scheme is that it does not necessarily differentiate itself fully
from the base case that the authors say is not good enough. Many of the trust values are based
somewhat directly on the successful and unsuccessful communications of nearby nodes.
Another interesting scheme comes from Zhan et al. in “TARF: A Trust-aware Routing
Framework for WSNs” (Zhan 2012). Here, the authors express belief that much of the research
around WSNs focuses heavily on energy efficiency while assuming that all nodes are honest.
They propose a trust-aware routing framework (TARF) that can be used in WSNs as a
lightweight and efficient scheme for secure routing to a base station. It can even be scaled up and
added to existing routing protocols in a variety of network types. Their contributions to the
typical security scenario include no requirement for tight time synchronization nor known
geographic information. Using this framework, it is possible for nodes to trust each other even if
!7

the information is not fresh or they might not even know where the other node is. They use both
simulations and real world testing to show the resilience and scalability of TARF in hostile
network conditions and against threats such as wormhole and Sybil attacks. A slight weakness in
their research is that they may have used too many friendly nodes. The attacks were strong, yet
they were sometimes very localized to certain sections of the network (floors of a building, in
their real-world tests). They also rely on a stationary base station which may not be an option in
our scenarios which rely on a mobile sink.
In “A Survey of Intrusion Detection Systems in Wireless Sensor Networks,” Butun et al.
survey many different methods for detecting a malicious node in a WSN (Butun, 2014). There is
a section on reputation/trust-based detection. They touch on names for the three very different
types of trust: subjective reputation, indirect reputation, and functional reputation. Subjective
reputation is based on information gathered from direct interaction with neighbors. Indirect
reputation is based on the cooperation of other nodes in the network. Functional reputation is
slightly different. Here the nodes are not basing their trust only on what other nodes are sharing
with them, but observations of the performance of the node in question based on certain
parameters like packet forwarding and route discovery. While these multiple layers of trust are
very useful, the overhead of managing multiple levels of trust while still functioning as a data
node remains high. This could overwhelm the ad-hoc networks with limited battery life with
which we are concerned.
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2.2- Mobile Sinks
Another very important aspect of geographical research is obviously the collection of
data. Wireless sensor networks can gather data in many different ways. They can use a base
station as mentioned before. If nodes are meant to be retrievable, certain ones can simply be
assigned to hold data. Some sensor networks will aggregate data at certain points in the network,
and, under certain conditions, continue to transmit partial data (Kalpakis, 2002). Sometimes,
however, location availability can change such as in a dangerous or volatile environment or even
something as simple as tides coming in and out. In these cases it can be necessary to use mobile
base stations or mobile sinks. A mobile sink is simply defined as a data gathering device that can
appear anywhere in the network to begin gathering data (Lin, 2012).
Rasheed et al.,in their paper “The Three-Tier Security Scheme in Wireless Sensor
Networks with Mobile Sinks,” further discuss mobile sinks (Rasheed, 2012). This is an inherently
insecure situation because these sinks have to reestablish trust with the sensors every time they
appear to gather data which is not a problem encountered with static WSNs. They developed a
three-tiered security scheme to make this reestablishment of trust that is simultaneously fast,
secure, and energy efficient. The basis of their scheme is that different security schemes are
delivered to network members at three different times both before and during deployment. There
are several levels of trust here. Nodes that have more recently interacted with these mobile sinks
can pass this information on, and hopefully trust can be built by the time other nodes in the
network encounter this mobile sink. There are some potential issues here, though. If an attacker
can spoof one node in the network, it is likely able to spread that throughout the three levels of
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keys from that node. They propose some protections against just this kind of “helper node”
situation, but they are unconvincing as they reliy on very specific assumptions of the network
and placement or implementation of the malicious nodes. Their scheme also involves using a
large portion of the nodes in the network to establish trust with each other. It is also helpful to
minimize the number of nodes with which we need to reestablish trust.
2.3- Clustering in WSNs
There is also an important method for organizing nodes that can be used in a scenario
with mobile or unknown sink locations discussed in two papers-: “A Framework for Trust-Based
Cluster Head Election in Wireless Sensor Networks” (Crosby 2006) and “Cluster-Based
Reputation and Trust for Wireless Sensor Networks” (Crosby, 2007). In these schemes, nodes of
a randomly distributed WSN organize themselves into clusters before sending data. In Figure 2,
we can see an example of this cluster organization. All of the nodes here are a part of the same
WSN, but, as the network is deployed, cluster heads are elected using one of several different
methods. These cluster heads (shown in red, green, and blue) act as local or relative sinks for
their slave nodes. Each slave node will report directly to their cluster head or master. In this
example, each slave has only a single hop to their cluster head, but larger networks or networks
with fewer cluster heads may have multi-hop paths whose routes are established at the time of
deployment.
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Figure 2: An example of a WSN organized into clusters

2.4- Trust Attacks in WSNs
Now we can see that there are several methods for organizing WSNs that will be helpful
in our scheme. Trust sharing and cluster management are very important, but what if an
adversary targets these? Manipulating trust values or clusters could be as bad for the network and
data integrity as stealing nodes or planting eavesdroppers in the network. It does not matter how
robust the network is if all of the data has been altered to the point of uselessness.
This work focuses on two types of attacks: trust-erasing and trust-pollution. Trusterasing attacks are a very simple and brute-force attack, but they can be very disruptive. In this
type of attack, malicious nodes will simply destroy the trust values of other nodes. Depending on
the complexity of the scheme, these trust values could take a long time to recover or simply be
lost. The second kind of attack, trust-pollution, is much more subtle. Trust-pollution attacks will
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raise or lower trust values of specific nodes to spoof certain changes in the network. This can
obviously be much more difficult to detect than a trust-erasing attack since it happens over a
longer period of time.
Next, we come to one of the most relevant papers to the work presented in this thesis. In
their paper “A Novel Approach to Trust Management in Unattended Wireless Sensor Networks,”
Ren et al. present several schemes to prevent certain types of attacks in a WSN (Ren, 2014). The
two main types of attacks they discuss are trust-erasing attacks and trust-pollution attacks.
The authors use a combination of nodes to produce, manage, and consume trust within
the network. This separation of duties contributes to the biggest strengths and biggest
weaknesses of the work. Trust manager nodes hold trust information for the entire network, and
they can be polled by other nodes in the network. While trust managers can easily watch out for
the activities of nodes in the network similar to the “watchdog” concept of similar works, they
need extra computing overhead compared to a standard node. The authors also use static
networks which are not reliant on battery packs, so their schemes do not need to be as energy
efficient. As we will see later, these ideas do not necessarily translate to our ad-hoc networks for
whom battery life is a major concern. They also rely on a fixed number of malicious nodes which
may not reflect a real scenario.

2.5- Summary and Our Motivation
The works presented here are all strong in their own right, but lack the flexibility an adhoc unattended sensor network will require. Through our research, we discovered that while
energy savings is a very important concept in ad-hoc WSNs, many of the schemes did not take
!12

this into account. The goal of the scheme proposed in the next chapters will be to combine
aspects of all of these ideas into solution to trust management and data integrity in these
networks that maximizes energy efficiency and longevity of the network while minimizing
overhead. The literature covers many topics in trust-based communication for wireless sensor
networks, but rarely addresses security issues with regard to mobile sinks or ad-hoc distribution
and data gathering. We aim to introduce a novel scheme by which a clustered WSN establishes
on-demand trust to report to mobile sinks and can protect itself against attacks while maximizing
network integrity.
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CHAPTER 3
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND DISCUSSION

First, let the problem be clearly stated. This work aims to create a scheme for trust
management, efficient cluster head selection and communication, and robustness against certain
trust-erasing and trust-pollution attacks on the network. We aim to maximize the amount of data
we are able to gather before the network no longer has enough battery power to sustain
connectivity while minimizing possible data loss or corruption to or from any trust-based attacks
by forming clusters in the network. By increasing the energy efficiency of the communication
schemes within the network, we can ensure that researchers will be able to gather data
consistently and more frequently.
Our network may be inactive for an unknown or variable amount of time until a mobile
sink appears to collect data. At this time, the nodes of the network will need to act quickly to
report data with the highest possible integrity. Once the nodes are distributed, each node will
quickly establish direct trust with its neighbors and elect cluster heads so they will be ready and
prepared to transmit data when a data collector arrives. When a sink is introduced to the network
and trust is established between it and its closest neighbors, route request packets (RREQ) will
be flooded into the network until each reachable cluster head is discovered and data collection
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can begin. Clusters will be further refined based on their neighbors’ trust values and possible
information about ongoing trust-based attacks reported by the sink device.
3.1- Trust Types
Before discussing the proposed solution further, we must describe the two different types
of trust we will be using for nodes in our WSN. Direct trust is establish with nodes that have a
direct connection with each other, i.e. nodes that are only one hop away from each other. Indirect
or reputation-based trust will be established once a mobile sink arrives to collect data. This is
the type of trust that will propagate through the network when data collection must occur.
Direct trust is calculated based on the direct communication of neighbor nodes as shown
in Figure 3. Here we can see Node A as the node attempting to establish trust. The transmission
range of Node A is shown by the red dashed circle. Node A will communicate with these nearby
nodes and begin establish trust. This trust value could be set, for instance, at a starter value of
0.5. These nodes, marked in blue in the figure, are in what is called Node A’s direct friend set,
that is, the one hop neighbors of Node A that can be vouched for through direct interaction. As
the network is first established, these will be the only nodes with which Node A will
communicate.
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Figure 3: Direct trust establishment between nodes

Indirect or reputation-based trust can be established when a node is more than one hop
away from a sensor. After a mobile sink appears, nodes will begin multi-hop communication. As
each hop is made, each node will report its trust list to the next. In this way, nodes will learn the
reputation of other nodes within the network with whom they cannot directly communicate. We
would set this reputation level at 0.25 or half of that of the direct friend set. This would be a
friends of friends set. An example of this can be seen in Figure 4 below. Here we see Node B,
which was established as a direct neighbor and friend of Node A before. The transmission range
of Node B is marked with a red dashed circle. We can see that Node B’s direct friend set has
some overlap with that of Node A, but it also contains two more nodes with which Node A has
no direct communication. If a mobile sink arrives in the transmission range of Node A, it will
communicate with Node B who will share its friend set with Node A. This allows Node A to
establish indirect trust with the two green sensor devices.
!16

Figure 4: Indirect trust establishment between Nodes

3.2- Deployment and Initial Trust
First, before deployment, nodes will be given a key that will be unique to their network.
This key will be used to determine the NodeID of each other node the devices come into contact
with. The key will also be used to authenticate the mobile sink when it arrives. They may use a
method similar to the one described in (Li, 2013) for the initial handshake procedure. Their
scheme use a modified public and private key system for authentication. Every node in the
network knows the public key to decrypt other nodes’ private keys. Li et al.’s scheme pairs or
groups certain nodes together before deployment. This may not be applicable in a randomly
distributed network such as ours, but the minimal information with which they are able to
authenticate other nodes is very useful.
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The nodes’ encrypted IDs will be sent to their neighbors. If a node is unable to determine
the authenticity of the NodeID of a neighbor because it is malicious or has an identification error,
that node will be blacklisted until it can prove its identity to a number of other nodes based on
the measured density of the network.
The nodes will awaken in a low power state to preserve their batteries. In this state, the
nodes will transmit at only half of their maximum distance. Transmission of data is by far the
most battery consuming part of the operation, and limiting this should greatly increase the life of
each node (Akyildiz, 2002).
As the nodes come online, they will broadcast to find possible neighbors once. The nodes
will only try to find neighbors during this initial deployment to save energy. The network is
unattended and assumed to be static after its initial deployment (Huang, 2013). Each node will
attempt to authenticate other nodes within their transmission range. Upon each successful
authentication, these neighbors will be added to the direct trust set (Dt) of the node. Once all Dt
have been established, neighbors will share the trust values of all of the nodes in their Dt with
each other. Nodes who do not share these neighbors will add them to their indirect trust set (It)
as described in the previous section.
In this way, all of the sensors in the network will populate their direct and indirect friend
sets with either neighbors or nodes two hops away. These initial trust values will form the basis
of the first cluster head votes as well as future trust updates propagated through the network.
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3.3- Initial Cluster Head Voting
Clusters are very useful in our ad-hoc network. While schemes presented in other works
manage trust through a tiered hierarchy of node types, there may simply not be any time or
energy availability to implement them. Since our network is formed at random, we cannot be
sure where any specific nodes will end up, and thus we cannot rely on pre-programmed behavior
once they are dispersed.
This problem is solved by network clustering. A cluster is a group of nodes that report to
a common node. Reporting nodes are called slaves and the nodes the slaves report to are cluster
heads or masters. By creating clusters, we effectively can create our own mini networks within
the larger network. These clusters can communicate and manage their own trust values without
the need of an outside watchdog or manager. Each cluster head can act as a gateway node for its
slaves, and these cluster heads can then create their own network to send data to a mobile sink
when it arrives on the scene.
Once each sensor has established their Dt and It sets, the cluster heads need to be elected.
Cluster head voting in this scheme is based on both trust and proximity. As most of the values in
each sensors trust tables will be similar after the initial trust establishment (only two values can
be taken), distance will play a large part in the initial vote for cluster heads. The distance portion
of the cluster head votes is important for several reasons. First, and most trivial, is the fact that
nodes can communicate better with closer neighbors. Secondly, nodes with many neighbors
make the best cluster heads because while the sink is present and collecting data, the cluster
heads themselves will not actually be using their onboard sensors to gather data. The power
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requirements of gathering and sorting the data from their slaves as well as transmission means
that their batteries are better used managing these needs. Each cluster head will preferably be in
the center of as many one hop connections as possible. If a cluster head is located in the middle
of many other nodes, these nodes will be able to “pick up the slack” in a sense- the fact that we
receive data from multiple nearby sources reduces the effect of the hole left by a node not
gathering data. Sensors can determine which of their neighbors have the most connections and
are most central. The cluster head voting algorithm can be seen in Algorithm 1.

Algorithm 1: Cluster Head Vote
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Line 12 of Algorithm 1 describes each nodes voting value. This value is normalized
between 0 and 1, inclusive, and heavily weights the nodes trust value (90 percent of the vote
value) over the distance to the neighbor (10 percent of the vote value). Whichever node gets the
highest vote value will be the one that the sensor votes for as its cluster head. Once each node
votes for a cluster head, the nodes with the majority votes will begin to gather slaves under them.
These slaves will report all data through the cluster head. The heads in the densest areas of the
network will typically be assigned first. Heads will continue to be assigned until each node in
each area of the network is covered by a master. The heads themselves will be assigned no
master as they will not be reporting data they gather themselves. One exception to this is “lone
wolf” sensors which have no contact with other sensors in their low power mode meaning no
other nodes are within their limited transmission range at dispersal. These nodes will elect
themselves as their own cluster head, and they will both gather and transmit data. Cluster heads
will then turn off their environmental sensors (again, with the exception of the lone wolves) and
switch to high-powered transmission mode doubling their transmission range.
Algorithm 2 describes the cluster head trust propagation method. Trust values for nodes
are between 0 and 1, inclusive. The trust multiple and starter values are used to ensure a wide
range of possible values while staying within the [0, 1] range. Cluster heads will increase their
slaves trust in their head by 60% of their current trust value as seen in Line 3. This ensures that
once a cluster head is voted for, in future cycles it will likely remain a cluster head unless it dies
or is found to be malicious. Cluster heads will increase their slaves trust of shared neighbors by
10% for each other node that is able to vouch for them with a positive trust value. All nodes with
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shared direct neighbors to the cluster will receive this boost in trust. This is a lesser increase, but
it reflects the cluster head’s knowledge that these nodes should also be able to be trusted.

Algorithm 2: Cluster Head Trust Propagation

In Figure 5, we can see what happens next once the cluster heads have been established.
Each cluster head will poll their slaves and increase its trust value in their tables. Then it will
look at nodes to verify trust in their neighbors. We see that Node A has established a direct trust
link with its cluster head and so these nodes already trust each other. This initial link would be
0.5 in both nodes’ trust tables. However, to get even more information, the cluster head will get
information from Node B about Node A. In this way each node will be verified to the cluster
head by several different disparate sensors and the cluster head will increase its trust of those
nodes accordingly. Since the cluster head knows Node A, its trust value would already be set at
0.5. Now, since the cluster head can see that Node B also trusts Node A, it will increase its trust
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value of Node A by its trust multiplier (1.6) to 0.8. Since it is a cluster head, it will also increase
Node A’s trust in it by the same value.

Figure 5: Initial trust updates from cluster head

The nodes are now arranged into clusters and their initial trust levels have been
propagated by the cluster heads, they can await notification of a mobile sink. Only the cluster
heads are waiting for this signal as all other nodes are now communicating only with their cluster
heads.

3.4- Mobile Sink Arrival and Data Collection
The nodes will not begin transmission yet for two reasons. The first is simply that they
have nowhere to send the data since a collection device has not arrived in the network. This
scheme is designed to be used in a scenario in which no dedicated gateway node can be used
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either due to time constraints or a dynamic or dangerous physical environment. The second is, of
course, to save battery life. A wireless node in this situation is not intended for retrieval after the
data is collected. As such, the nodes should be designed as cheaply as possible which means
small batteries. We must conserve these batteries as long as possible to get important sensing
data from the nodes, so we will wait until a message is received from a sink that the node should
begin transmission.
Eventually, when the researchers are ready to collect data, a sink device will be
introduced to the network. This sink device may be a simple laptop computer that someone is
holding nearby, or it could be a more complicated device that is dropped into the network after
the initial deployment that can gather data and transmit it to a safer location further away. In
either case, the sink will arrive in an unpredictable spot in the network. It is imperative that the
nearby nodes recognize it quickly and establish authenticity. The mobile sink will need to use the
secret network key to establish any communications with its neighbor nodes. Once these nodes
gain trust in the sink, data transmission can begin. The method is described in Algorithm 3.
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Algorithm 3: Data Collection

The sink will need to send RREQs out to the various cluster heads in the network. Each
node in the network will forward the sink’s packets as well as an encapsulated list containing
their direct friend set. Each cluster head will store these lists and establish a routing table. Once
enough nodes have been discovered (some may have died or disappeared or they may simply not
be needed due to redundancy or other reasons), the routing information will be sent back to the
sink and minimum spanning trees connecting the cluster heads will established (Lines 1-5 in
Algorithm 3).
When the mobile sink begins to collect data, nodes will send data to their cluster heads
which will choose the routing for each packet. The slave nodes themselves do not need to know
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where the packets are going, they just know that their cluster head is trustworthy. The cluster
heads, in turn, trust other cluster heads because they have all of the routing information (or
partial routing information, depending on network size).
Each cluster head throughout the network is operating now in high powered transmission
mode meaning they can transmit at double the range of a slave node. (Remember, slave nodes
only transmits at half their possible range to save power.) This helps to ensure that the mobile
sink will be found and that there will most likely be a valid path through the network while
limiting the extra overhead of “chatter” between the nodes. Each slave can transmit a minimal
distance to keep open connections and possible interference to a minimum.
Cluster heads additionally report their trust tables and those of their slaves to the sink.
Each cluster head maintains a partial trust table based on its slaves and their trust tables. The sink
will be able to see a full trust table for the entire network. Once this is gathered, the sink will
check for any red flags. If it does not find any problems, the sink will simply send out a new trust
table to all of the cluster heads. They will maintain this new list and possibly share it with their
slaves.

3.5- Sink Disappearance and Further Trust Propagation
After the mobile sink collects as much data as it needs from the network and shares the
new trust table with the cluster heads, the cluster heads broadcast the signal for a new vote. Each
node (including the cluster heads themselves) will vote for a new head based on the new trust
information they received. This is similar to the initial vote, but higher variance will begin as
new trust values have been propagated through the network. Additionally, remaining battery
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power is now taken into account. Trust is again further propagated by the new cluster heads as in
Figure 5. It is important to reevaluate the cluster heads after each data collection epoch. Trust
attacks can occur at any level of the data transmission cycle, and it is critical to minimize the
impact of affected nodes as quickly as possible.
An overview of the processes presented in this chapter can be seen in Figure 6. This
figure describes the Data Collection Cycles of the network. Every time the network goes through
the steps of voting for cluster heads, propagating trust down, sending collected data to the sink,
and updating trust values, one data collection cycle has been completed. After the initial
distribution of sensors, the network will settle into the described cycle until it is either too
degraded to function further or the researchers are finished. For our network, we want to
maximize the number of possible cycles. This means the researchers can get more data over a
longer period of time. We also aim to minimize the impact of any trust attacks. This will be
measured by how many data collection cycles it takes to isolate malicious nodes.
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Figure 6: The data collection cycle
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CHAPTER 4
IMPLEMENTATION AND METHODOLOGY

Due to the high cost of hardware and for the sake of simplicity and flexibility, all testing
for this project has been done in simulation. This chapter will be an exploration and explanation
of the programs used.

4.1- Background
All programming for the project was done in Python. Visualization was a large
component of the troubleshooting and exploration of this project, and Python is one of the easiest
ways to create useful visualizations. A description of the needed libraries and their use is
included below in Table 1.
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Table 1: Listing and explanation of the libraries used
NumPy
numpy.org
matplotlib
matplotlib.org

Numpy is a commonly used package for scientific computing. Here it
was used mostly for its simplification and abstraction of certain maths as
well as its superior random number generation capabilities.
Matplotlib is a library used for figure and visualization generation.

networkx
networkx.github.io

The NetworkX library is a graphing library that was used to simulate the
connections in the network. Well known shortest path algorithms are
used in the routing and route discovery of the project.

Tkinter
tkdocs.com

Tkinter is a library used for creating GUI elements in Python similar to
Swing in Java. The entire UI as well as some data visualizations were
done using Tkinter and, to a lesser extent, ttk which is a way of handling
widgets in the UI.

4.2- Graphical User Interface
Nearly all of the testing for the project is controlled through a graphical user interface as
seen below in Figure 7. There is a display area on the left side which depicts the network in two
dimensions (three dimensions can be used in the simulation, but the z-axis is not represented
visually). The right side contains a series of buttons and panels controlling various aspects of the
data collection cycle and displaying simulation information, respectively. Further images of the
simulation will focus mainly on the visual representation of the network in the left panel.
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Figure 7: High level view of the simulation controller

4.3- Creation of the Network
The first thing to do is create a random network of sensors. The sensors themselves are
custom Python objects that contains data structures that represent the tools found on a real world
sensor such as the ability to transmit to neighbors, gather data about their environment, share
trust values, etc. Each node also holds a table of trust values it gathers throughout the simulation.
This is initially composed only of their Dt and It sets, of course, but is quickly expanded to
include distant nodes they cannot normally connect with.
In Figure 8 we can see a network of one hundred randomly distributed sensors. The
sensors themselves are represented by green dots and their NodeID is displayed below them. The
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sensors in the simulation are represented physically only as points, and thus the size of the green
dot is meant to serve as a visual aid only. Here we can see that the nodes have already contacted
their neighbors and developed initial communications. Each node is shown connected to its
neighbor by a thin gray line. These lines represent a possible wireless connection between two
nodes that is less than 125 meters (the low-power transmission distance).

Figure 8: An initialized network in the simulator
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4.4- Algorithms and Their Representations
In this section will discuss the implemented algorithms and their visual representations in
the simulation software. These are the algorithms that will be used to test against previous
schemes in the next chapter.
The next step is for the nodes to vote for their initial cluster head. During the previous
step, each node populated their initial trust tables (Dt and It ) with the values 0.1 for direct friends
and 0.05 (half of direct) for indirect friends. It is possible for nodes to have trust values for other
sensors anywhere between 0 (complete distrust) and 1 (complete trust), inclusive. Now that the
nodes have their initial trust values, they will vote for and assign cluster heads based on
Algorithm 1.
After the initial cluster head vote, every node will either have or be a cluster head, and
they will wait for the mobile sink to arrive. In Figure 9, we can see how this is represented in the
simulation visualizer. Note that we are now looking at a smaller network of only forty nodes in a
smaller area for clarity’s sake. Cluster heads are now represented by a dark purple color, and
each cluster has been assigned a random color to set them apart visually. (Circles have been
added around each cluster after the fact to make them easier to see.)
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Figure 9: State of the simulation after initial cluster head vote

Here we can see that the cluster heads are generally located in the center of densely
populated areas. On the left side, we can see that Node 30 is rather isolated from the network
overall and so it is assigned as a head since Node 14 already has several slaves. If Node 1 had
been assigned to Node 14 as a slave, then Node 30 would be effectively turned into a lone wolf
without a connection to the network and it would have to assign itself as a head. If Node 1 had
been assigned to Node 14, then Node 30 could not have used it as a head (again, a node cannot
be a head and a slave at the same time) which would once again turn it into a lone wolf. This
configuration effectively adds flexibility while minimizing the number of cluster heads needed to
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cover the network. The cluster heads also enter a “high power” mode for transmission doubling
their previous range to 250 meters.
After this initial cluster head vote and assignment, the cluster heads share their trust
information with their slaves according to Algorithm 2.
The simulation can report information about any node at any point. Simply clicking on
the node will display its pertinent data in the “Selection” window on the right side of the screen.
For example, in Figure 10, we can see the information about Node 15. First, the coordinates of
the node are displayed (this particular simulation is in two dimensions, so no z-coordinate is
displayed). Then, we see whether or not the node is currently a head, and, if not, what the node’s
head is. Here, it is Node 25. Its neighbors are Nodes 7, 64, 30, 58, 59, 25 and 41, and we can see
the distance to each of those nodes. Do note that the distance here is always less than 125 meters
as that is the assigned “low power” transmission range for slave nodes. These neighbors are the
nearby nodes that Node 15 would be able to potentially create a wireless connection with (and
did upon authentication). Beneath this list of neighbors is the initial trust table for the node.
Each sensor’s trust table is represented as a simple Python dictionary consisting of a key (another
node’s ID) and a value (the current trust value this node holds for the other). The trust value here
shows things we expect. Indirectly trusted nodes (neighbors of neighbors) hold the trust value 0.5
as this is half of the initial trust value. Several nodes have elevated values as the cluster head has
vouched for them. Node 7, for instance, has many several connections in common with Node 15
so Node 7 has gotten positive feedback from their shared cluster head. Node 58 would have a
similar value, but is cut off in the figure. Node 25 will have a value of 0.8, being Node 15’s head,
but it is also out of the current window.
!35

Figure 10: An example of information available in the simulation

Now that the nodes have all established their clusters and initialized their trust tables,
they either sit and wait until they are told by their cluster heads to gather data or a mobile sink
arrives and starts speaking to the network. There are two different settings on the nodes. One is
to simply wait until they get further instructions to collect data. This would be used if, for
instance, the data they are gathering is non-complicated and could be gathered quickly like a
temperature reading. This data is easily sensed and stored, and it requires no extra processing by
the node. In this way, the data can be gathered very quickly as the mobile sink arrives and the
data will be more fresh. The other setting has the nodes begin gathering data about their
surroundings immediately. This would be useful for more subtle data such as vibrations or other
long term changes in the area. A network that is designed to have data gathered one time only
!36

would certainly use something like this. As this research looks at the long-term energy efficiency
of a network that has multiple epochs of data gathering, we will focus on the former scenario.
Our nodes now simply wait idly for the signal to begin transmitting.
This scheme is designed to work in a network that is by definition unpredictable. The
random distribution of nodes is the first step, but the location and time of data gathering can also
vary greatly. When a mobile sink is added to the simulation, it can appear anywhere within the
field at random. The playing area can be set to any size (limited mainly by screen size or
resolution requirements), and the nodes within are not distributed in any normal pattern. It is
entirely possible for the mobile sink to miss areas of the network.
In the real world, the mobile sink could be anything such as a laptop computer or other
“smart” device carried by hand or in a vehicle or even a drone. In our simulation, the mobile sink
is, in fact, stationary as are all of the other nodes in the network. “Mobile” simply refers to the
fact that it never appears in the same place more than once. Further, in the simulation, the mobile
sink is programmatically very similar to a common sensor. It does not extend the Sensor class,
but it borrows heavily from it with some minor modifications.
When the mobile sensor arrives in the network, it is represented as a large red dot labeled
“SINK” as shown in Figure 11 (and will from here be referred to as SINK). The SINK has a
transmission range similar to the cluster heads’ (250 meters). The red lines represent a Minimum
Spanning Tree through the subnetwork of the clusters heads and SINK using the well-known
Kruskal’s algorithm. The lighter gray lines of the “low power” transmission connections have
been hidden for clarity in this figure. The dashed circle represents the transmission range of
SINK and is mainly there for troubleshooting purposes. Note that the simulator does not display
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only the minimum spanning tree for the subnetwork. The red lines represent all possible wireless
connections between the cluster heads.

Figure 11: Example of a mobile sink’s arrival

We also notice that some of the cluster heads are different than in the previous example.
This is because mobile sinks have arrived several times between initialization and this diagram.
Node 22, for instance, has been voted a cluster head where it was previously a slave to Node 13.
As trust values were re-propagated through the network, new cluster head votes occurred during
the data collection cycle.
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Algorithm 3 ensures that data is collected evenly throughout the network. Nodes that are
father away from SINK will report their data first. Data can be gathered and passed through
another cluster head without that head being able to read it. This will become very important
later as we attempt to protect the network from trust degrading attacks.
Once the mobile sink has gathered the data from the network sensors, it can analyze the
data for discrepancies and it also constructs and examines the universal trust table delivered by
all of the nodes. The universal trust table is an n by n matrix, where n is the number of sensors in
the network that notes the trust values for every node and by every node. This data is unavailable
until it reaches the mobile sink as it provides a full picture of the network which would be very
desirable for an adversary. We assume that future mobile sinks all have access to the previously
gathered data of old sinks. Because of this, data can be compared to historical data to check for
tampering. The mobiles sinks also have access to historical trust value data, and will use
Algorithm 4 to create a new table of trust recommendations. Any nodes whose trust values are
changed by values outside a certain chosen threshold, 𝛿, will be yellow flagged as in Lines 8-9 of
Algorithm 4. If they fall outside this range again, they will be red flagged, and nodes will be told
to cut communications with them during the next data collection cycle. If no suspicious activity
is discovered, then the sink will simply return this newly compiled universal trust table after
completing Algorithm 4. This information is sent back down through the subnetwork as either a
list of new trust values or suggested amounts by which to change values.
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Algorithm 4: Sink Data Analysis

These new trust values will be used for the next round of cluster head votes that happen
after SINK leaves. This will likely lead to new cluster heads being assigned as time goes on. As
trust becomes more established, patterns will lock in and cluster heads will tend to remain the
same until their batteries are used up. Once this happens, they are removed from the network and
we continue if the network has not degraded past the point of usability.
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4.5- Representations of Malicious Nodes
The previously described algorithms will work nicely to gather data, but trust values are
not incredibly useful in a vacuum. Many possibilities could exist for malicious nodes being
present in a network. Any secure system is only as secure as its weakest point. The type of adhoc network described so far in this project are going to be used in dynamic and possibly hostile
environments. Imagine a series of these sensors deployed into a military zone where researchers
are using vibrations gathered by the nodes to discern troop movements. The enemy would
certainly want to feed these sensors false data or make sure they were not reporting to the proper
nodes.
In this simulation, Malicious Sensors are an extension of the regular Sensor class.
Malicious sensors are marked in the simulation with a red circle as shown in Figure 12. Where
the previous sensors have acted benevolently at all stages of the data collection cycle, these
nodes may interject at any time to try to disrupt the proper collection of information. In doing so,
malicious nodes attempt to get themselves elected as cluster heads to have more power within
the network. This is achieved by altering the functions that update, share, and propagate trust in
two main ways.

!41

Figure 12: Malicious sensor marking

The first way, again, is the brute force method called trust-erasing. This method simply
seeks to erase the trust values of as many other nodes as possible. Once a node’s trust table has
been destroyed, it can take a while for it to be rebuilt if the mobiles sink is only giving trust
suggestions versus an updated trust table (ie.- 0 times .3 is still 0). It could take multiple data
collection cycles before the node is acting properly again.
The second method is to more carefully strike by lowering or otherwise altering trust
values of neighbors or slaves. This is a much more sneaky attack which can be harder to deal
with. The trust-erasing attack is very “loud” and leaves a thorough signature. This type of attacktrust-pollution- acts in a more strategic way. Its effects may not manifest themselves
immediately, and could corrupt or leak data for one or more data collection cycles.
The focus of this work is not the prevention of malicious nodes being introduced to the
network. This is mainly handled by private key or private NodeID distribution before the sensors
are even deployed. If a sensor does not recognize the signature of another, it will simply not add
it as a neighbor. By using a scheme such as that proposed in (Kakade, 2013) or public/private
key authentication, we can easily isolate the malicious nodes as seen in Figure 13.
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Figure 13: Malicious nodes have been isolated by authentication failures

For the purposes of the proposed scheme, we will assume that malicious nodes have been
able to join the network. The focus then will be to find them as quickly as possible, and remove
them and their data from the data collection cycle. Trust-erase attacks are more easily
discovered, and Algorithm 4 should uncover the problem very quickly (as seen in the next
chapter). We can also see the tell-tale signs of trust being erased in the simulator itself as seen in
Figure 14. Here we can see that Node 87 unfortunately had a malicious node (Node 65) assigned
to be its cluster head. Once Node 65 gained the trust of Node 87, it erased all of that node’s trust
values as well as its memory of all neighbors other than the malicious node itself. This will lead
to Node 87 only being able to vote for Node 65 as its cluster head, and it will never learn new
trust information about its previous neighbor Node 15.
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Figure 14: A victim of a trust-erasing attack
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CHAPTER 5
NUMERICAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

In this chapter, we will compare our trust management scheme (hereafter called cluster
head trust propagation [CHTP]) with that of Ren et al. in three different ways (Ren, 2014). First,
we will take a look at the overall energy efficiency of the schemes. Without introducing trust
attacks, we will see how many data collection cycles each scheme is able to complete. When our
nodes are sharing their trust values more efficiently, the network will survive longer for us to
gather data. We will say our network is viable until 50% of the nodes’ batteries are dead.
Our second and third metrics will look at trust-based attacks. Again, we will measure
success in number of data collection cycles (cluster head vote, cluster head trust propagation,
data collection, and trust evaluation), but here we will see how many data collection cycles it
takes to eliminate or isolate all malicious nodes from the network.
We will compare and discuss the energy efficiency and recovery efficiency of the
previously proposed solution with the trust management solution of Ren et al. In their work, the
authors proposed a system of Trust Producers, Trust Managers, and Trust Consumers. This
system has neighbors of nodes acting as trust producers- they generate trust based on the nodes
around them. However, instead of each node keeping their own trust information, these tables are
stored on other nodes called trust managers. The nodes (trust consumers) need to poll these trust
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managers instead of cluster heads every time they need trust data. Each data collection cycle, the
mobile sink will report the trust tables back down to these trust managers. Clusters are still
formed, and cluster heads are used to report the data, but any trust updates have to come from
these separate nodes. These nodes are differentiated in the simulator by blue circles as shown in
Figure 15. These trust storage/manager nodes are positioned throughout the network such that
each subnetwork (if any) has access to at least one of them.

Figure 15: A portion of the network containing trust manager nodes

5.1- Energy Efficiency of Simple Transmission and Data Collection
Before we look at malicious node attacks, first let us just look at the general performance
of these trust manager nodes from an energy efficiency stand point. For these tests, we will be
looking at a 1000m x 1000m field with a varying number of sensors randomly distributed
throughout. The numbers of sensors are 50 (a sparse network), 100, 150, and 200 (a very dense
network). To examine the energy efficiency of the trust scheme, we will look at the number of
completed data collection cycles before the network has reached failure. Network failure is
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defined as having less than 50% of the nodes in the network capable of transmitting data. For this
test, we will count only transmission, reception, and gathering data as exercises that use power as
these are the most energy-hungry activities on each node (Akyildiz, 2002). Storing data and
cluster head voting is less intensive and all nodes are doing it equally, so it has been abstracted
out of the simulation. The batteries start at 100 units. In the simulation, transmitting data requires
3 units of power, while gathering data and receiving data require 1 unit each. Trust managers
compose up to 20% of the network in the trust manager simulations. Each test was run 25 times
on randomly generated graphs.
The results for this first test are shown in Figure 16(A). Along the x-axis are marked the
numbers of nodes or densities of each graph. The bars show how many full data collection cycles
were able to be completed before the network reached a failure state. The darker color denotes
the simulations with the trust managers, and the lighter color used trust CHTP. In the previous
figure, it is clear that CHTP was able to last longer than the trust managers scheme. On average,
CHTP gets 31.25 percent more data collection cycles completed than the trust managers. This
performance is especially elevated in the sparse networks with only 50 nodes in the large area.
The extra transmissions required to reach the trust managers taxed these limited networks which
rarely managed to reach ten data collection cycles. The CHTP, on the other hand, completed just
over twice as many data collection cycles with an average of seventeen. The other three densities
are very similar in their results. The cluster head scheme completed 35%, 34%, and 33% more
data collection cycles than the trust managers in the 100, 150, and 200 node networks,
respectively. The more robust networks were able to handle the extra traffic of the trust consumer
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polls somewhat more effectively. As trust managers failed, those nodes doing the polling could
reach a new trust manager that was not necessarily that far away.
The results of testing energy efficiency during a malicious attack are shown in Figure
16(B). For these tests, the networks contained 20% malicious nodes conducting trust-based
attacks. The results are similar as the network is doing the same amount of trust-polling and
updating regardless of whether or not an attack is currently under way, but, on average, the
network remains about 0.9 data collection cycles less. This is somewhat more pronounced in the
dense graphs where we lose about two data collection cycles. This happens because as malicious
nodes become isolated, there are less available nodes in the network for traffic. These nodes are
effectively treated as if their batteries had run out.

A

B

Figure 16: Trust Managers versus CHTP energy use
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Although we did not specifically test for it, the original paper’s measure of a successful
test was is “at least” one trust manager remained alive in the network. In this test, new trust
managers were elected as old ones died, and so we were always left with at least one at the end.
On average, there remained 1.4 trust management nodes alive at the end of simulation, but their
batteries were typically quite low (< 20% remaining).
Tests were also done which varied the percentage of initial trust management nodes. The
results were similar to those in Figure 16 until the network reached about 65 percent trust
management nodes. At that point, the schemes leveled off in performance since they were now
doing very nearly the same thing. Twenty percent was the value used in the original paper, and is
the upper limit of a realistic distribution.

5.2- Trust-erasing Attacks
As has been mentioned, the trust-erasing attacks are a blunt method for attacking the
trust values of a network. One way of making these attacks slightly more sophisticated is for
malicious nodes to sacrifice themselves to obscure information. If two or more of these trusterasing nodes are able to become neighbors, then only one will begin erasing trust. This has two
benefits for the malicious nodes. First, since the attack is easily detectable, it ensures that nodes
“on the same team” are more likely to remain in the network. It can also have a secondary effect
of possibly pushing its former neighbors to vote for the other nearby malicious nodes as their
cluster heads. If we refer to Figure 17, we can see an example of this in action.
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Figure 17: Two trust-erasing nodes in collusion

Here, two malicious nodes, Node 53 and Node 47, are neighbors. Node 47 has been
elected cluster head and has three slave nodes. Nodes 42 and 67 are regular nodes, and Node 53
is a malicious colluder. When the CHTP phase of the data collection cycle occurs, Node 47 will
erase the trust tables of its slaves. When the mobile sink analyzes the universal trust table, it will
recognize this and send out updated trust tables for nearby nodes to black list Node 47 (including
Node 13 and the one that is not visible beneath Node 47 itself). Now that Node 47 is isolated,
Nodes 42 and 67 are very likely to vote for Node 53 as their cluster head on the next round. This
leads to another cycle of data collection for the attacker.
For our tests with trust-erasing nodes, we will look at the response time measured in data
collection cycles for the network to recognize and isolate malicious nodes. For these tests,
similar parameters will be set. First, the 1000m x 1000m playing area will be the same. Each
test’s network will be made up of 100 nodes but will vary the percentage of those nodes that are
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malicious. As the percentage of malicious nodes increases, the likelihood of them being next to
each other and able to collude also increases. Remember, when the sink returns the universal
trust table back to the network after analyzation, it can either be encapsulated and sent directly to
the nodes themselves or shared only to the cluster heads which will then propagate the new
information. Sending the trust tables to the cluster heads can save a very small amount of energy
in the network, but the cluster heads could then give falsified information to their slaves. They
could even not give them the information at all. As we know this is a malicious environment, we
will send the data directly to the nodes themselves. For the trust manager setup, the newly
updated table is sent to the trust managers directly. These tests were again repeated twenty-dice
times on randomly generated graphs.
The results for this test can be seen in Figure 18. The x-axis shows the percentage of
malicious nodes used in each test. The y-axis shows the number of data collection cycles, on
average, it takes to isolate all malicious nodes in the case of a trust-erasing attack.
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Figure 18: Trust-erasing attack mitigation results with yellow flagging

On average, it takes about half a cycle less for the CHTPe to isolate all of the malicious
nodes in the network. As the sink analyzes the trust data, it always takes at least two cycles to
isolate the nodes. On the first cycle, the sink will see zero trust values and yellow flag them.
When a node receives a yellow flag in the universal trust table, that is simply a signal for the
nodes to lower their trust values for their head slightly. If a second round of zero trust values
come in, then the node is red flagged and will be isolated during the next cluster head vote. In
Figure 19, we can see similar results but slightly faster if we skip the “yellow flag” step of
analysis.
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Figure 19: Trust-erasing attack mitigation results without yellow flagging

The results are similar, but each of them are around one cycle faster to isolate the nodes.
As the percentage of malicious nodes increases, it obviously takes longer to isolate them all
because there is a higher percentage of colluding nodes. The largest jump comes between twenty
and thirty percent. Here, the average number of cycles to isolate nearly doubles as the likelihood
of neighbors or even clusters of malicious nodes can work together to only erase trust when they
are alone. Skipping the yellow flag step results in faster isolation of nodes, but it is less fault
tolerant. If there is an error in reporting, that node will likely be flagged and isolated before the
problem could be solved. Still, it is useful if researchers are in a hurry or if there are enough
available sensors to make up the difference from possible losses.
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5.3- Trust-pollution Attacks
The second type of attack is the more sophisticated trust-pollution attack. Here, cluster
heads will monotonically reduce trust values in their slaves’ trust tables at certain time intervals.
For our testing purposes, these time intervals will simply be at the beginning of each data
collection cycle. Trust-polluting nodes behave as normal, except they slightly lower the trust
values of known good nodes in their slaves’ trust tables as well as slightly raising those of theirs
and other known malicious nodes.
We will look at two slight variations of this attack. The first will raise and lower trust
values by the same value each time (0.5). Each data collection cycle, the nodes will do this to
their slaves increasing their value and decreasing the value of all or their Dt and It sets. The
second test will use randomized instead of fixed values. In these, malicious nodes will raise and
lower by values ranging from 0.3 to 0.6. This should make it more difficult to detect both
because the pattern will be more confusing to the mobile sink, and because it will take longer for
the trust values these nodes are lower in to hit zero.
The setup for these tests are the same as that of the trust-erasing attack from before. The
difference is that the mobile sink needs a change threshold value at which the trust changes in the
nodes will be flagged as possibly malicious. This value is called delta and denoted with 𝛿. For
the fixed value test, we will use 𝛿 = 0.02. This means that if the change in trust value is different
from the expected change by more than 0.02, this will earn the node a yellow flag (or red if it has
already been flagged before). The main variable here will again be the percentage of malicious
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nodes. For brevity, we will only look at the results that include the “yellow flag” stage. The
results of this first test can be seen in Figure 20.

Figure 20: Trust-pollution attack with monotonic changes

In sharp contrast to the trust-erasing attacks, it was much more difficult to isolate the
malicious nodes when the percentage of them was lower. It is still easier to discover these nodes
when there are fewer of them, but it took nearly 1.5 more cycles on average to do so over the
trust-erasing attacks. We also notice a large dip of nearly a full cycle on average in the time it
takes for the CHTP scheme to isolate the malicious nodes. This is because the sensors get their
data directly from the sink before the next round of cluster head voting begins. Overall, it took
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more cycles to discover and isolate the malicious nodes. However, both schemes were still able
to accomplish this relatively easily.
For the second test, the values will be changing at random making them more difficult to
determine. For this set of tests, 𝛿 will now equal 0.04 in an attempt to make up for the wider
range of possibilities. The results of the second test can be seen below in Figure 21.

Figure 21: Trust-pollution attack with varying values

This test shows a significant jump in the amount of cycles it takes to isolate malicious
nodes. It took an average of 2.5 more cycles to isolate the nodes in the lower probabilities and
increased nearly 8 more cycles at the highest probability level. When nearly half the network is
malicious nodes, their obstructions of trust values are much more difficult to notice. If we
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increase the value of 𝛿 higher with the range of variability these malicious nodes show, we begin
to flag non-malicious nodes. As the percentage of malicious nodes rises, so does the percentage
of possible data collection cycles that are potentially wasted by hunting for these malicious
nodes. At the somewhat more realistic level of 20% malicious nodes, the trust manager scheme
needs approximately 46% of the possible data collection cycles to eliminate the threat of
malicious nodes. The CHTP scheme, however, needs only around 25% of the cycles to do the
same job.
If we look back to Figure 16, we can compare how many total cycles of useful network
life it actually takes to isolate these nodes in a trust-pollution attack. That is, what percentage of
cycles are potentially wasted as malicious nodes are possibly misreporting data. Now, all data is
not necessarily bad during these attacks as many nodes are behaving normally, but this is a good
benchmark for performance. As these tests are all conducted with 100 nodes in a 1000m x
1000m area, we will look only at that result. On average, under the trust managers scheme, the
network remained viable for approximately 19 data collection cycles where CHTP lasted 26. We
can see the results in Table 2. As we can see, it takes a much lower percentage of the possible
data collection cycles for the CHTP scheme to isolate these nodes. Not only does it isolate them
more quickly, it supports a longer lifespan in an untainted network.
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Table 2: Percentage of viable data collection cycles required to isolate malicious nodes
% Malicious Nodes

Trust Managers

CHTP

10

44.7

31.5

20

52.6

34.2

30

64.2

38.5

40

73.1

49.2

50

92.6

63.4
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION

In this thesis, we have explored the unique needs and opportunities provided by ad-hoc
sensor networks. A simulation program was built to achieve a visual representation of these
networks which provides us with an easy way of understanding how they are arranged and how
they change over time based on new information gathered during data collection cycles. We
examined the benefits of trust-based schemes in these networks as well as two different types of
attacks that could damage that trust- trust-erasing and trust-pollution. Several heuristic
algorithms were developed to maintain energy efficiency while minimizing the negative effects
of these attacks. Finally, we presented a numerical analysis of our scheme versus another
published scheme and showed that it was both more energy efficient with its trust-sharing
techniques as well as more effective at isolating malicious nodes within the network.
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